Contrary to the view that democratic aspiration has been utterly marginalised in China since the 1990s, the discourse of democracy continues to flourish via the Internet and other means of communication, and a budding "rights defence movement" (weiquan yundong) has emerged as a new focus of the Chinese democracy movement in China. The emergence of this rights defence movement foreshadows a new, more optimistic political scenario in which transition to a stable constitutional democracy through constructive interactions between state and society may occur. This paper explores the social and political context behind the rise of the rights defence movement in China, assesses the role played by rights defence lawyers (weiquan lushi) in shaping the rights defence movement and speculates on the implications of the rights defence movement for China's transition to constitutional democracy.
The emergence of this rights defence movement in connection with the new development of the legal profession foreshadows a new, more optimistic political scenario in which transition to a stable constitutional democracy through constructive interactions between state and society may occur. Legal reforms in China have come a long way since the beginning of the "reform era" in 1978 when the legal profession did not exist and there were only two laws, namely The Constitution and The Marriage Law. Over the last three decades, the ideas of a legal system, the rule of law and human rights have eventually taken roots in Chinese society;
China has enacted hundreds of laws and established a modern court system and hundreds of law schools; China has actively participated in the international human rights regime, signing more than 20 international human rights conventions; and the leadership has allowed space for the growth of the legal profession, with more than 150 thousand lawyers employed at 14 thousand law firms in China today. An essential point of this paper is the interdependency of the rule of law and transition to constitutional democracy in China, a relationship in which the rights defence movement is playing a vital role. The paper explores the social and political context behind the rise of the rights defence movement in China, assesses the role played by rights defence lawyers (weiquan lushi) in shaping the rights defence movement and speculates on the implications of the rights defence movement for China's transition to constitutional democracy.
The Rise of the Rights Defence Movement in China
The current rights defence movement is a comprehensive movement involving all social strata throughout the country and covering every aspect of human rights. Due to a strict ban on organised opposition, rather than taking the form of a coordinated nationwide movement, the rights defence movement has instead developed as a diverse and increasingly forceful wave of isolated cases reported daily in the media, as well as public protests ("mass incidents", the term coined by the Chinese communist party-state to describe unapproved strikes, assemblies, demonstrations, petitions, blockages, collective sit-ins or physical conflicts involved 10 or more people) . Those "mass incidents" numbered 60,000 in 2003, 74,000 in 2004 and 87,000 in 2005 , an average of 200 protests a day, according to official figures. (Yu 2007; Hu 2008) . Some of them may involve thousands of people and result in police and paramilitary intervention leading to loss of lives. The movement is not merely "rightful resistance" of the rural poor (O'Brien and Li 2006) , but has also become an urban phenomenon facilitated by the growing strength of the middle class and the latest technologies such as the Internet and mobile phones.
Defence of economic and social rights
Most cases of this rights defence movement aim to defend economic and social rights, including protests by peasants against excessive taxes, levies and forced seizures of farmland; strikes of workers against low pay, arrears of pay and poor working conditions; protests by laid-off urban workers against unfair dismissal by their employers; protests by home owners against forced eviction by government and developers; protests of residents against forced relocations; campaigns by citizens for unpaid social entitlements; campaigns for the rights of women and children; and protests of affected residents against environmental pollution.
Many serious protests involve peasants, the largest and most vulnerable "disadvantaged group" (ruoshi qunti) in China, accounting for more than 60% of the entire population.
Detrimental factors such as lack of arable land, lack of capital, poor education, poor technology and poor accessibility make the life of Chinese peasantry difficult. Their hardship is exacerbated by the state discrimination, especially the "household registration system" which limits the mobility of peasants and deprives them of the state welfare and the opportunity of employment in the state sector. Although replacement of the "people's commune" with "household responsibility system" and other policies in the reform era since the 1980s have increased autonomy and mobility of Chinese peasants, their life chance is still greatly limited by the subsistence agriculture relying on a very small piece of land allocated to each household. While this small piece of land generates very little income for peasant households, until very recently they had been very heavily taxed and levied to fund the salaries of local cadres and public projects. Worse still, land in the rural areas is run by local governments and does not belong to individual peasants. More often than not, local cadres collaborate with property developers to use the land for commercial purposes to bring in local financial income and personal gains, with little benefits for peasants. The peasants launched protests when they were desperate. One important development in last two years was that in some areas the peasants have raised bold demand for land ownership. In December 2008, when separate groups of peasant farmers in four provinces, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu and Shaanxi and Tianjin (one of the four provincial level municipalities) published very similar statements on the internet claiming to have seized their collectively owned land from the state and unilaterally privatised it (Shi 2008) . The Chinese law stipulates that all rural land is owned by the state, which leases it to individuals to use on a 30-year contract basis but can take it back with relative impunity. The peasant rebellions and appeals by lawyers and liberal intellectuals have put tremendous pressure on the state to revisit the policies on the landownership.
In spite of the strict ban by the state, strikes by workers have become increasingly frequent in China, especially by the most vulnerable migrant workers from rural China, who are denied the right to collective bargaining or to form trade unions outside the official All China Federation of Trade Unions. Bureaucratic constraints often prevent them from obtaining legal redress for owed wages and other labour rights violations (Chan 1998) . According to labour expert Han Dongfang, director of China Labour Bulletin, the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong Province, China's industrial powerhouse manufacturing one-third of Chinese exports, sees at least one major labour dispute involving at least 1000 people daily, not to mention those smaller strikes (Lee 2008) . One new development is that China's Labor Contract Law, which came into effect in January 2008, has provided further encouragement for workers to assert their rights of better working condition and higher pay within the legal framework. 
Defence of civil and political rights
The cases of defending civil and political rights are also on the rise, including campaigns by lawyers, journalists and writers for the freedom of speech and press; campaigns by practitioners of the Christian house churches and Falun Gong practitioners for the freedom of religions, beliefs, assembly and association; campaigns against arbitrary detention , "reform through labour", torture and excessive death penalty; campaigns by victims of the party-state agents against injustice and abuses of public power, particularly by thousands of petitioners who flow to the national capital or provincial capitals from all over the country to seek redress from perceived injustice; Protests by migrant workers against the household registration system and other discrimination; and protests by peasants against the irregularities and manipulation in village elections.
The fights by millions of Falon Gong followers and Christian family church members to assert their rights of beliefs and religions have attracted a great deal international attention.
The Leninist party-state in China permits five official religions -Buddhism, Islam, Taoism, Catholicism and Protestantism -provided that they submitted to strict state supervision.
When spiritual entrepreneurs try enticing followers on their own or anyone practicing religions without state sanction, they are banned. Falun Gong began in 1992 as a form of qigong, a general name describing physical and mental disciplines based loosely on traditional Chinese medical and spiritual practices. According to historian David Ownby, Falun Gong is a new version of Chinese traditional "redemptive societies." They are organised around charismatic leaders who preach that salvation can be attained through cultivation of body and mind (Ownby 2008) . On April 25, 1999, more than ten thousand Falun Gong practitioners gathered outside Zhongnanhai, the guarded compound where China's highest leaders live and work, in a day-long peaceful protest of police brutality against fellow practitioners in the neighboring city of Tianjin. Stunned and surprised, and with the fear of a potential threat to their legitimacy and control, China's paranoid leaders declared Falun Gong an "evil sect" (Xiejiao) and launched a campaign of brutal suppression against the group. Within a few months, the police had imprisoned tens of thousands of Falun Gong followers. The group claims that some 3,000 of its members were tortured to death in custody. Falun Gong has survived the suppression and transformed into a well-financed and well-coordinated international movement. While Falun Gong followers in exile have launched vigorous counter-charges in their own comprehensive media against the Chinese communist regime, those within China have turned into underground practitioners.
Chinese family churches (jiating jiaohui) are assemblies of unregistered Chinese Christians independent of the government-run Christian organisations. They are also known as the "Underground" Church or the "Unofficial" Church, although this is somewhat of a misnomer as they are collections of unrelated individual churches rather than a single unified church.
They are called "family churches" because as they are not officially registered organisations and they cannot independently own property. Hence they meet in private houses, often in secret for fear of arrest or imprisonment. Family churches operate outside government regulations and restrictions, but they are not officially outlawed. Their leaders and members are often harassed by the government officials mainly for the fear of popular mobilisation outside the government control. This persecution may take the form of arrest, a prison sentence, re-education through labour, confiscation and heavy fines. Family church members, numbering at least 50 million and accounting for 70% of total Christians in China, have rigorously fought back by organising demonstrations and defending themselves in lawsuits (Wei 2007) .
In another development, illegal interception and arbitrary detention of petitioners bringing grievances to higher authorities in China have become more systematic and extensive, and hence a major concern. China's petitioning system has a long cultural and historical tradition dating back to imperial China and remains in place under the Communist rule. The legal basis for the current petitioning system, known as the Letters and Visits system, is provided by the Chinese Constitution which protect the rights to petition and the State Council Regulations on Letters and Visits, which provides a systematic and coherent framework for the practices of petitions. The Chinese government encourages petitions and has an extensive governmental bureaucracy to handle them, because the party-state needs the petitioning system as a window to understand the sources of social problems and unrest and as a release valve to maintain social stability, in the absence of other channels to raise grievances, politicallycharged grievances in particular. However, officials at all levels of government have a vested interest in preventing petitioners from speaking up about the mistreatment and injustices they have suffered. Local authorities in particular have always been motivated to prevent information about rights abuses committed at the local level from reaching higher authorities.
As petitioners bring complaints about lower levels of government to higher authorities, they face harassment and retaliation. After 2003, when the Custody and Repatriation System that controlled population movement by detention and forced return to their places of household registration was abolished, the Chinese government has developed a complex extra-legal system to intercept, confine, and punish petitioners in order to control and silence them, often employing brutal means such as assault, surveillance, harassment of family members, kidnapping, and incarceration in secret detention centres (known as 'black jails'), psychiatric institutions and Re-education through Labour Camps. The interception of petitioners violates a number of basic human rights, such as the rights to freedom of expression, to liberty and security of person, and to freedom from torture and other cruel, degrading or inhumane treatment. Petitioners, officially estimated to be 10 million, believe strongly that their rights have been violated and persist to seek redress, but they are amongst those most vulnerable to human rights abuses in China today (CHRD 2008) .
Factors contributing to the rise of the rights defence movement
Qin Hui, one of the most important Chinese scholars concerned with rights issues, has argued that the secret of China's current economic advantage is its low human rights standards, a salient feature of "power elite capitalism" (quangui ziben zhuyi). China has become an investor's paradise because the prices of the four prime factors of production (human capital, land, credits and non-renewable resources) have been kept at artificially low levels by reducing the bargaining power of providers through political suppression (Qin 2007a) . There is no doubt that one essential factor behind China's economic success is the abuse of rights and the environment (Yu 2006; Yu 2007; Wu 2008) . The Chinese authorities also admitted that the current waves of "mass incidents" stem from the wide spread of rights abuses, including land seizures, forced evictions, and environmental disasters (Li 2009 ).
Nevertheless, the theory and practice of social movements have demonstrated that even widespread abuses do not necessarily lead to social protests; other factors may be required, such as a split within the ruling bloc, and the evolving rights consciousness and political calculation of the population (Scott 1985; Foweraker 1995) . The development of the Chinese democracy movement since the 1980s and the re-emergence of liberalism and social democracy since the 1990s have greatly enhanced rights consciousness among the Chinese population Goldman 2005 The Chinese government has always defended its human rights record against international criticism, sometimes defensively, arguing that feeding and clothing 1.3 billion people supersedes political rights in the short term, and sometimes more aggressively, arguing that no country has the justification to interfere in the internal affairs of another country, including criticizing its human rights record. However, despite this defensive rhetoric, efforts have made even by the Chinese Party-State to come to terms with human rights. One could argue that until the 1990s, the law had been cynically exploited by the Party-State as a tool for shoring up its dictatorship. The international discourse on human rights was officially repudiated as "bourgeois liberalism" and as a "Western conspiracy of peaceful evolution" -in other words, an attempt to overthrow the Chinese regime by stealth. However, partly due to domestic and international pressure and partly as a response to the imperatives of a developing market economy and globalisation, the Party-State has begun to engage in a real dialogue on human rights and has adopted a cautiously positive approach towards international human rights norms since the 1990s. Rights lawyers have not only rigorously defended various victims of rights abuses, but also played an important role as opinion leaders to link rights defence cases with political aspirations for the rule of law and constitutional democracy. In their role as professional lawyers, they not only represented clients in ordinary cases, but also took up politically sensitive cases involving victims of state power, defending political and civil rights with a focus on cases of wider social and political significance, and provided legal aid for individual and collective rights defence action kept within the realm of law. As legal activists and opinion leaders, they publish regularly on "sensitive topics" via the Internet and other media outlets, organise or participate in political petitions, and consciously use lawsuits as social mobilisation for legal and political reform (Ji & Wang 2005) .
Precisely because of this dual role, rights lawyers have been constantly harassed by the partystate: blacklisted, suspended, monitored, confined, detained or even jailed (Fu 2006; Liu 2006) . Lawyers, and particularly rights defence lawyers, are vulnerable due primarily to continuing flaws in the Chinese legal system, which still does not recognise a fully independent judiciary and privileges the Party-State over any of its "enemies", real or The clashes between rights lawyers and the party-state indicate profound contradictions in current legal and political systems in China. On the one hand, mainly through importing legal institutions from the West, a modern legal system has been established since the late 1970s (Zou 2006) . On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party still seeks to maintain their monopoly on political power and the power structure of Leninist party-state, creating intrinsic contradictions between the rule of law and the supremacy of the Party. The constitution is granted the "highest legal authority"; courts are granted power to handle law cases; and legal norms and procedures are put in place to protect citizens against abuses.
However, according to the concept of "socialist rule of law", the principle of the "Party leadership" must be upheld and the Party power should not be undermined by law. As a consequence, rights lawyers were punished when they crossed the line drew by the Party, although the authorities have refrained from suppressing the legal activism of rights lawyers entirely, at least partly because it operates carefully within the law and uses China's judicial system to advance its aims.
Implications for China's transition to constitutional democracy
Several empirical studies have been carried out on the practices of Chinese lawyers and legal aid workers (Michelson 2006; Gallagher 2006; S.Liu 2006; Cai 2007) . However, these studies do not focus on rights defence lawyers, and they conclude that the vast majority of
Chinese lawyers have no interest in upholding the rights of ordinary citizens against Statesupported defendants. The reasons for this reluctance are that such cases are both politically risky and often have little or no economic pay-off (Michelson, 2006) . It is true that only a small minority of lawyers are actively engaged in rights defence cases, but we argue that the social and political impact of these lawyers is much broader than their numbers might suggest. It is extremely important to study this impact, and to demonstrate the link between the work of these lawyers and broader political and social reforms in China.
The rights defence movement is a tremendous boost to the initial development of civil society in China, transforming the peoples' consciousness from that of obedient subjects to autonomous citizens; transforming the orientation of many quasi-governmental organisations from the Party-State to their true constituencies among the people; and encouraging citizens to further organise themselves for civil rights purposes. As tens of thousands of NGOs and professional associations play increasingly important roles in economic, social and political change in China and the term "civil society" (gongmin shehui) has long become part of Chinese political vocabulary, there is a debate among China's scholars whether the concept of "civil society" can be applied in analysing this new development (Brook and Frolic 1997) .
Our position is that civil society should be understood as the intermediate associational realm situated between the state on the one end and the private realm (including individuals, families and firms) on the other. Contrary to the experience in the West, where civil society grew naturally from the society, the emerging civil society in China today comes from the reversing direction and is dependent on the withdrawal of, and subject to the negotiation with, the Leninist party-state, which had taken up the space of associational life and continues to deny the right of citizens to free association (Feng 2006 Internet, and increasingly the state-controlled media, are also contributing to the emergence of a genuine public sphere and serious debates on social and political issues. Migrant workers, numbering more than 100 million, have started to establish their own unions, and the call for the establishment of peasant associations receives increasing support from enlightened government officials as well as the public.
The rights defence movement also contributes to the progress of the rule of law and democratic transition in China. Convinced that there is an interdependence between economic and political development, China scholars seem to have reached a consensus that China will democratise in the long run, either through an evolution entailed by sustained economic growth, openness to the outside world and the accompanying social change, or through a violent eruption when an unexpected economic breakdown challenges the remaining legitimacy of the current regime, based as it is primarily on economic performance (Brzezinski, et al 1998) . However, opinions are divisive about the timing of democratisation in China, and scholars have found it hard to identify the kinds of actors who will actually bring about democracy there. There is a huge body of literature on the decline or crisis of Communist rule, the emergence of democratic ideas, and the development of the democratic movement against the Chinese Communist dictatorship (Davis 1995; Weatherley 1999; Angle 2002 ). However, research that focuses on the democratic movement in opposition to the Party-State has not been able to provide satisfactory answers to the questions of timing and actors, because the exiled leaders of this opposition movement have been effectively marginalised by the CCP.
Answers should be sought elsewhere. The processes of the transformation in other former communist countries have shown that most important actors were "inside the system" rather than "outside the system" (Feng 2008) . Rights defence lawyers have helped to frame the demands of protesters within the broader language of defending basic human rights, and have thereby shamed the Chinese Party-State into upholding its own laws and stated ideals. As a new development, Rights lawyers played an essential role in drafting up Chapter 08, known by some as the "Chinese human rights manifesto", signed by more than 8,000 Chinese citizens since its publication on the Internet on 9 December 2008, clearly articulating constitutional democracy as an alternative to one-party dictatorship in China and spelling out 19 steps for political reforms, including a new constitution, freedom of speech and assembly, an independent judiciary and democratic elections for all levels of government.
There are those who argue that progress in rule of law is irrelevant to the political transition to democracy. It is our belief that the quest for rule of law is vital for China's transition to constitutional democracy, which we would define as a political system where the legitimacy of the government is ensured by fair elections and government powers are limited by a constitution that guarantees fundamental rights through a democratic legislature, an accountable executive and an impartial judiciary. Law, even if it is the same, functions differently in different political systems. There is a fundamental difference between the "rule by law", in which the law is an instrument for rulers, and the "rule of law", in which the law is an instrument used by everyone for justice and the rulers are also subject to the law. (Maravall & Przeworski 2003) . The rule of law is intrinsic to constitutional democracy but impossible in a dictatorship or autocracy, simply because dictators and autocrats are not subject to law. Some scholars have argued that China will continue reforming its legal system while maintaining the current authoritarian political regime for the foreseeable future, a socalled "thin" rule of law system (Peerenboom 2002 (Peerenboom , 2006 ). Yet this view underestimates the catalytic power of reforms to the legal system, particularly in the current international environment, when the Chinese government must be seen to embrace universal human rights norms in order to retain its international credibility and continue to attract foreign investment.
As the government ratifies human rights and other international treaties, it faces increasing pressure both domestically and internationally to uphold the basic legal rights of its citizens, as set out in its national laws and constitution. Rights defence lawyers clearly understand this dynamic, and in seeking to assist citizens to uphold their legal rights, many of these lawyers have a much more ambitious agenda in mind. In their various writings, these rights defence lawyers clearly relate their legal work to a broader political and social reform agenda. (Teng 2007; Mo 2008; Xu 2008) . They making the Chinese government more accountable to its citizens, and this will require much deeper reforms to the legal structure -such as introducing a truly independent judiciary and removing the influence of the Communist Party over the appointment and discharge of judges and lawyers. (Wang 2005) In other words, they demand a "thick" rule of law system, which can only function normally in the power structure of constitutional democracy.
Conclusion
By definition, the current rights defence movement in China is a social movement asserting the constitutional rights by Chinese citizens through lawful means within the legal framework of the country. With their professional knowledge and extraordinary courage, rights defence lawyers have fought in the frontline and provided leadership to this emerging movement (Carnes 2006; Li 2007) . Led by this group of rights lawyers, some citizens in China have been able to file and even win their cases at courts, achieving concessions and negotiated outcomes from the state. However, it is inevitable that rights defenders are forced to at least implicitly confront and challenge the political structure of one-party dictatorship. The system of Leninist party-state is set up in such a way so as to virtually ensure that corruption and abuse of power become endemic, since there is no access to an independent media, no independent judiciary court system, no political opposition and no accountability guaranteed by regular elections. The battles of the rights defence movement at the legal front may provide an important step for political reform toward constitutional democracy.
The impacts of rights defence cases in contemporary China have extended far beyond the judiciary domain. The most recent wave of rights defence protests has shown the determination of Chinese citizens to assert their right to be consulted in decisions that directly affect their lives, a clear sign of their awakening sense of real citizenship. For those rights lawyers, well educated and idealistic, the ultimate aim of the right defence movement is to effect a political transition from one-party dictatorship to constitutional democracy. Using the laws and courts the party-state has put in place, they are putting into effect the state rhetoric on rights and translating constitutional rights into reality. The end result can be a robust civil society with legal protection of human rights, predominance of the rule of law, and a political structure of constitutional democracy in which the government is formed through periodic elections and subject to the law.
